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(ALMOST) EVERYTHING YOU WANTED TO
KNOW ABOUT CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Charles F. C. Ruff*

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE. 3 volumes (with pocket parts). By Wayne R.
LaFave and Jerold H. Israel St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co.
1984. $211.
Professors and students, defense counsel and prosecutors, judges
and clerks - all have been waiting for someone to produce the
"Corbin" or "Prosser" of criminal procedure. Virtually every other
field of the law has its definitive work or works. Major areas of criminal procedure have been the subjects of learned treatment in law reviews, and endless numbers of casebooks have been prepared for
classroom use. Prospective consumers assumed that the law was developing too rapidly, particularly in the critical area of search and
seizure, to justify the investment of time and money in the preparation
of a full-blown treatise. Yet equally volatile subjects generated everything from one-volume texts to looseleaf services to multivolume
tomes.
If taxes and securities and employment discrimination merited
their own treatises, why not criminal procedure? Again, the untutored
have assumed that the market would not support the product - that
sales would be limited to law school libraries, some large firms, a few
criminal practitioners successful enough to afford more than a manual
for solving routine day-to-day problems, and a smattering of other
lawyers interested enough in the general subject to invest in a good
working reference. Without exploring the vagaries of the publishing
business, one can only guess what it was that finally convinced West
Publishing to leap into the breach. Whatever their motive, the result
is an important work - not Corbin or Prosser, but valuable
nonetheless.
Users of treatises seldom spend much time reading prefaces and
introductions; they leap directly to the substance, caring little about
why the authors have done what they have done or what theoretical
goals they have tried to achieve. Nor have these authors provided any
temptation for the reader to linger over their opening pages, which
consist of a brief preface and the usual tributes to those who assisted in
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the research and typing. The reviewer, searching for guidance as he
attempts to test the authors' purpose against their performance, is
given only the following:
We have sought in these three volumes to analyze the law governing all
of the major steps in the criminal justice process, starting with investigation and ending with post-appeal collateral attacks. . . . We have also
sought to go beyond describing "the law" as it currently stands, exploring as well its historical roots and underlying policies. [P. III.]1

With this limited explanation, it is difficult to judge whether
Professors LaFave and Israel have succeeded either in achieving their
own goals or in meeting the expectations of their readers. One who
has dabbled in academia, spent most of his career as a prosecutor, and
recently come to the private practice of law, can appreciate this work
for what it offers - clear and concise analysis and an eminently usable
resource for student, teacher and practitioner. At the same time, from
whatever perspective one views it, one is left with an odd sensation
that, in trying to be all things to all readers, this treatise is not quite
right for any.
On the one hand, no one will spend his spare hours reading
LaFave and Israel either for new insights into the jurisprudence of
criminal procedure or for that special argument that will mean victory
in the courtroom. On the other hand, although it will not regularly be
cited in briefs or in judicial opinions, lawyers and law clerks will have
it close by when the moment comes to begin their research.
I do not intend to damn with faint praise. Our firm library had a
copy ofLaFave and Israel on the shelves within days of its availability,
and I can conceive of no well-stocked law school, law firm, court or
government library that will long be without it. Yet one cannot help
but wonder if that is what the authors hoped for. Did they envision
their work on a professor's desk, well-thumbed and spine broken from
repeated use? Did they see the trial lawyer dashing into the library for
one last look before going into the courtroom? Did they expect their
book to engender lively debate with challenging analysis and novel approaches to old problems? It is hard to tell.
Recognizing the enormity of the task before them and the prospect
that the legal ground would be shifting constantly beneath their feet,
the authors have sought out a compromise: almost every conceivable
issue is at least briefly touched upon; the critical areas are explored in
some depth; and the reader is given a foundation for additional research. Like all compromises, however, this one will leave some read1. The authors describe a division of responsibility which seems to have left Professor
LaFave with the bulk of the substantive material and Professor Israel with the general introductory chapters (Chs. 1, 2), the grand jury (Chs. 8, 15), right to counsel (Ch. 11), discovery (Ch.
19), and appeal and collateral attack (Chs. 26, 27). P. IV.
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ers dissatisfied, the extent of that dissatisfaction depending on their
expectations.
Volume 1 of the treatise consists of ten chapters covering the core
fourth, fifth and sixth amendment issues - search and seizure, interrogation and identification. Volume 2 covers the pretrial process, including appointment of counsel, release, the decision to prosecute, and
such lesser topics as venue, joinder and speedy trial, as well as discovery, guilty pleas, and the right to fair trial. Volume 3 covers briefly the
trial process itself, double jeopardy and sentencing; the remainder of
the volume is taken up with appeals and collateral review, and an extensive appendix of rules and statutes.
The reader who comes to these volumes looking for a description
of the law as it is (or at least as it was in July 1983, the cutoff date for
Supreme Court opinions), will find a reliable and clearly written analysis of virtually every aspect of the criminal process. The coverage of
no area is so thorough that the researcher can rely on it as exhaustive,
but signposts to the open issues are well marked, and the reader will,
at worst, find the text and citations a handy starting-place for further
inquiry.
If, however, one comes looking for the jurisprudence of criminal
procedure, one will find that, with a few notable exceptions, there simply is not much room for theory in the midst of the densely packed
descriptive material. One exception is the extraordinarily well-written
discussion of the constitutional theories underlying the Supreme
Court's criminal procedure decisions (pp. 55-129). Professor Israel
has provided in some seventy pages a lucid history of the development
of selective incorporation and related doctrines - a history which
could well substitute for the opening sections of casebooks that track
the same process through severely edited cases and textual footnotes
or serve as a guide for the student who is trying to bring some order to
a semester's wanderings in the byways of the typical criminal procedure course.
If there was any area of criminal procedure that presented the authors with a risk of rapid obsolescence, it was the exclusionary rule,
and they have, in fact, found themselves with a text written when the
Supreme Court had granted certiorari in the "good faith" cases2 but
published after those decisions had been announced. As the text now
stands, the authors have in some five pages (vol. 1, pp. 136-41) set out
and rejected the various arguments against the rule, ranging from the
more emotional claims of those who would free the police from its
"handcuffs" to the proposals of the Chief Justice in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents. 3 The notion of a "good faith" exception pro2. United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984); Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 104 S. Ct. 3424
(1984).
3. 403 U.S. 388, 411 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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posed by Justice White in dissent in Stone v. Powell 4 is given equally, if
more moderately, short shrift, and the Court's refusal to adopt such an
exception in Taylor v. Alabama 5 and United States v. Johnson, 6 followed by its avoidance of the issue in Illinois v. Gates, 7 is seen as signalling the death of the "good faith" campaign.
The authors make only passing reference to the Fifth Circuit's
adoption of a "good faith" exception in United States v. Williams, 8
certainly a case worth more detailed discussion if one were attempting
to predict the outcome of the Supreme Court's debate. The grants of
certiorari in Massachusetts v. Sheppard 9 and United States v. Leon 10
are flagged in a brief footnote (vol. 1, p. 140 n.58), and the suggestion
that a warrant-based exception be adopted is left with only the comment that, "[d]oubtless some would oppose [it]" (vol. 1, p. 141).
Whether or not it would have been possible in July, 1983, to predict the results in these cases, a somewhat more elaborate discussion
would at least have mitigated the impact of the early publication date.
As it is, a substantial portion of the exclusionary rule chapter has become irrelevant and will remain so until the publication of the first
pocket-part. 11 The reader with little or no expertise in the field runs
the risk of being misled, while the experienced reader will simply bypass this section of the treatise until it catches up with the state of the
law.
The body of the chapter on "Arrest, Search and Seizure" (vol. 1,
pp. 130-359) provides a clear and concise overview of the fourth
amendment that will be useful for the student or the lawyer newly
come to the area. For the prosecutors in the audience it must be noted
that, when the authors move from the descriptive to the analytical,
their commentary has a certain defense orientation. Even for defense
counsel, however, their criticism tends to focus on the merits of
Supreme Court decisions now well ensconced rather than on current
issues still being litigated in the lower federal and state courts. This
problem, one supposes, is unavoidable in a treatise that seeks to cover
so much ground in such limited space.
An odd organizational decision has placed the introductory discussion of the exclusionary rule (vol. 1, pp. 130-62) at the beginning of the
section on "Detection and Investigation of Crime," and the discussion
of standing, fruits and the exceptions to the rule some 600 pages away.
4. 428 U.S. 465, 536 (1976) (White, J., dissenting).
S. 457 U.S. 687 (1982).
6. 457 U.S. 537 (1982).
7. 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
8. 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1127 (1981).
9. 104 S.Ct. 3424 (1984).
10. 104 S.Ct. 3405 (1984).
11. Since the writing of this review, the 1985 pocket parts have become available. -

Ed.
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In between come presentations on wiretapping, interrogation, identification, the grand jury and, strangely, entrapment. This arrangement
is unlikely to prove troublesome to those who know what they are
looking for and can simply turn to the appropriate subsection, but
again the neophyte may wonder why it is not possible to present a
more integrated analysis of the subject.
In addition to its odd placement, the discussion of entrapment is
more extensive than is justified by the importance of the purely legal
issues and yet inadequate in its coverage of the current controversy.
The public debate over the entrapment defense in recent years has
made it one of the most controversial issues in the law of criminal
procedure - perhaps second only to the exclusionary rule. The authors devote a considerable amount of space to the origins of the defense in Sorrells v. United States 12 and Sherman v. United States, 13 and
to the "debate" over the "subjective" and "objective" theories. They
treat that debate, however, as though it had considerably more realworld significance and continuing vitality in the courts than the typical practitioner would perceive.
The discussion of the "Abscam" cases in this context is brief but
telling (vol. 1, pp. 428-29). In addressing the question of whether law
enforcement officers should be required to have some "reasonable suspicion" that an individual is engaged in criminal activity before offering him inducement to do so, the authors recognize the adverse
implications of United States v. Russell. 14 They point to Abscam,
however, as a source of "renewed interest in this issue" (vol. 1, p. 428)
because "there a convicted swindler and other middlemen who were
themselves under investigation decided which politicians would be offered bribes" (vol. 1, p. 428). This highly simplistic description of the
Abscam scenario then leads to brief citations to Representative Edwards, the prime congressional critic of the operation (vol. 1, p. 428
n.18), and to an article in The Nation that proposes the use of a warrant procedure. 15 Only in a footnote is it mentioned that all attacks on
the Abscam convictions were rejected by the courts of appeals (vol. 1,
p. 428 n.19), and no mention is made of the one dispassionate congressional study of the operation. 16
In the real world the entrapment defense has meaning only in the
extraordinary cases - the DeLorean prosecution, for example - and
even in those the defense has meaning less as a legal issue than as a
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

287 U.S. 435 (1932).
356 U.S. 369 (1958).
411 U.S. 423 (1973).
V. 1, p. 429 n.20 (citing Chevigny, A Rejoinder, nrn NATION, Feb. 23, 1980, at 205).

SENATE SELECT CoMMITTEE TO STUDY UNDERCOVER ACTIVmES OF CoMPONENTS
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, FINAL REPORT,
REP. No. 682, 97th Cong., 2d Sess.

(1982).
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vehicle for attacking the government's tactics and evoking some sympathy for an otherwise unsympathetic defendant. In routine drug
cases, where entrapment has most often been raised and where the
bulk of the unfavorable case law has developed, the defense virtually
never succeeds. Yet the unsophisticated reader may well be left with
the idea that the entrapment doctrine provides some meaningful control over police conduct. It might have been more useful for the authors to have analyzed the facts of the Abscam cases and the juries'
and courts' responses to those facts in an effort to explain just why the
defense, whatever academic appeal it may have, offers little solace to
defendant or defense lawyer. Instead, they have provided the reader
with citations to the critics without offering anything in the way of
detached assessment - an approach that smacks more of advocacy
than scholarship.
If the authors' messages on the exclusionary rule and entrapment
are clear, they seem in other parts of the treatise to have gone out of
their way to avoid reaching any conclusions. For example, in their
introduction to the chapter on the grand jury's screening function (vol.
2, pp. 282-85), they present the arguments for and against continued
reliance on the indictment process in what is little more than a compilation of the ideas of other commentators and offer no assessment of
their relative merits. Similarly, on the issue of plea bargaining, their
summary of the many vices and limited but important benefits of that
process gives the reader nothing that has not been said many times
before (vol. 2, pp. 554-70).
All of which is not to say that the effort has not been worthwhile.
These volumes represent the only comprehensive work in the field.
They are lucid and thorough. West's decision to publish and the authors' decision to write are more than justified by the product. Professors LaFave and Israel can be expected to offer in other forums the
insightful analysis of important issues that has characterized their
other work, and while we await that day, we can be content that they
have, for now, provided us with a first-rate reference that fills a space
on our shelves too long left empty.

